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Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is a
promising solution for secure transmission under massive access.
However, in addition to the uncertain channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdroppers due to their passive nature, the CSI
of the legitimate users may also be imperfect at the base station
due to the limited feedback. Under both channel uncertainties,
the optimal power allocation and transmission rate design for a
secure NOMA scheme is currently not known due to the difficulty
of handling the probabilistic constraints. This paper fills this gap
by proposing novel transformation of the probabilistic constraints
and variable decoupling so that the security guaranteed sum-rate
maximization problem can be solved by alternatively executing
branch-and-bound method and difference of convex program-
ming. To scale the solution to a truly massive access scenario,
a first-order algorithm with very low complexity is further
proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed first-order
algorithm achieves identical performance to the conventional
method but saves at least two orders of magnitude in computation
time. Moreover, the resultant transmission scheme significantly
improves the security guaranteed sum-rate compared to the
orthogonal multiple access transmission and NOMA ignoring CSI
uncertainty.
Index Terms—First-order algorithm, limited feedback, mas-
sive access, non-orthogonal multiple access, outage probability,
physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of the Internet-of-Things, mas-
sive number of users and devices will access wireless networks
at the same time [1]–[3]. However, the large amount of data
flowing in various wireless propagation channels poses sig-
nificant privacy and security challenges to the next-generation
wireless system design [4]. Although physical layer security
exploits channel capacity difference between the legitimate
user and the eavesdropper to protect the legitimate transmis-
sion, this technique, when applied in its primitive form, is vul-
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nerable in multiple access systems since eavesdroppers have
more targets to choose from [5]. Fortunately, non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) technique provides a promising
solution by serving a group of legitimate users through power
domain multiplexing [6], thus generating artificial interference
to the eavesdroppers [7].
Pioneering works on NOMA with security consideration
assume perfect channel state information (CSI) of the legit-
imate users’ channel and imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper’s
channel [8]–[10]. Under this assumption, secure transmission
with NOMA achieves a higher secure transmission rate (i.e.,
transmission rate with secrecy outage probability constraint
satisfied) than the time-division multiplexing and frequency-
division multiplexing access [11]. While these results are
encouraging, the assumption on perfect CSI of the legitimate
users’ channels is too strong in practice, especially with
massive users where a large number of CSIs from legitimate
users need to be fed back to the base station (BS). As a result,
limited feedback or vector quantization error is inevitable. Due
to the uncertainty in the legitimate users’ CSIs, an outage may
also occur during the legitimate transmission [12].
To ensure both the legitimate transmission outage proba-
bility and the secrecy outage probability are within tolerable
levels, the secure transmission scheme design should incor-
porate two probabilistic constraints, which unfortunately do
not admit closed-form expressions for further analysis. To
overcome this challenge, this paper adopts the quantization
cell approximation [13] and the Bernstein-type inequality [14]
to transform the intractable probabilistic constraints into de-
terministic ones. Furthermore, by introducing an auxiliary
variable and leveraging Lambert W function, the constraints
are decoupled. Then, the resultant problem is readily solved
via block coordinate ascent approach [15], where branch-and-
bound algorithm [16] and difference of convex (DC) program-
ming [17] are respectively used to handle each subproblem.
While the above algorithm is a workable solution, it does not
scale well with network size. When the size of the network is
large, both branch-and-bound algorithm and DC programming
would be too time-consuming. To scale the transmission
scheme to massive access, a fast first-order algorithm is further
proposed by exploiting the block separability of constraints un-
der the alternating maximization framework [18]. In particular,
to replace the branch-and-bound algorithm, the multiple-ratio
structure of the objective function is exploited, and a quadratic
transform is employed to obtain an iterative algorithm, which
converges to a local optimal solution. On the other hand, to get
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Fig. 1. System model of downlink massive access secure NOMA network.
around the DC programming, a projected-gradient method [19]
is employed to obtain a stationary point. It is proved that
the overall first-order algorithm is guaranteed to converge.
Furthermore, simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
first-order algorithm reduces computation time by at least
two orders of magnitude compared to the method employing
branch-and-bound and DC programming while achieving the
same performance. Finally, simulation results show that the
resultant transmission scheme achieves a significantly higher
security guaranteed sum-rate than the orthogonal multiple
access scheme and NOMA scheme ignoring CSI uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. System model
and the security guaranteed sum-rate maximization problem
are formulated in Section II. Then, the probabilistic constraints
are transformed into deterministic constraints in Section III.
In Sections IV and V, a conventional solution and a first-
order algorithm are respectively proposed. Simulation results
are presented in Section VI. Finally, conclusion is drawn in
Section VII.
Notation : Column vectors and matrices are denoted by
lowercase and uppercase boldface letters, respectively. Conju-
gate transpose, transpose, Frobenius norm, trace, the modulus
of a scalar and mathematical expectation are denoted by (·)H ,
(·)T , ‖·‖F , Tr(·), |·| and E{·}, respectively. The notations [x]+
and Pr(·) stand for max{x, 0} and probability, respectively.
CN (0, b) denotes the circularly symmetric complex normal
distribution with zero mean and variance b, and Exp(λ) de-
notes the exponential distribution with mean λ. The principal
branch of Lambert W function is defined by W0(x)eW0(x) = x
for x ≥ −1/e with W0(x) ≥ −1 [20].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a downlink secure multiple-input single-output
(MISO) system as shown in Fig. 1. There are one N -
antennas BS, M clusters of single-antenna legitimate users
with cluster m having Km users, and J passive single-antenna
non-colluding eavesdroppers (Eves) who potentially wiretap
any message being sent. This paper considers the massive
access setting in which
∑M
m=1Km > M and assumes that
all wireless channels experience quasi-static Rayleigh block
fading (i.e., all channels are subject to zero mean complex
Gaussian distribution). The main channel (i.e., from the BS
to user k in cluster m) and the eavesdropper’s channel
(i.e., from the BS to Eve j) are respectively denoted by
d
−α/2
m,k gm,k ∈ CN×1 and d−α/2e,j ge,j ∈ CN×1, where gm,k ∼
CN (0, µ2m,kIN ),ge,j ∼ CN (0, µ2e,jIN ) are the small-scale
fading vectors, dm,k and de,j respectively denote the distances
from the BS to user k in cluster m and the Eve j, and α
denotes the path-loss exponent. At network initialization, a
randomly generated codebook consisting of M = 2B unit-
norm vectors each with length N (denoted by {gˆm}Mm=1)
is designed off-line and made known at both the BS and
users via codebook distribution scheme [21]. Then, the BS
sends a sequence of training symbols to all users who perform
channel estimation to obtain knowledge of their own channels.
Since channel estimation error is negligible when the training
sequence is long and when signal-to-noise ratio is high [22],
it is assumed that the CSI of the main channel is accurate
at the users. After channel quantization (using the codebook
obtained earlier from the BS), each user conveys its channel
direction information (CDI) using B bits over the feedback
channel to the BS. Due to the limited feedback per channel
coherence block, the CSI of the main channel obtained at the
BS is imperfect [23]. But the BS can still group users into
clusters based on the obtained CDI.
Employing the well-known quantization cell approxima-
tion [24], the users having the maximum inner product be-
tween their small-scale fading vectors and gˆm are assigned
to cluster m, and the value of Km is automatically obtained
after the grouping. The normalized channel vector g˜m,k :=
gm,k/‖gm,k‖ and gˆm are related by [23]
g˜m,k = (cosβm,k)gˆm + (sinβm,k)em,k, (1)
where em,k ∈ CN×1 is the unit-norm quantization error vector
isotropically distributed in the nullspace of gˆm, and βm,k
represents the angle between g˜m,k and gˆm with sin2 βm,k
being a random variable with variance determined by B [24].
By employing NOMA transmission, the su-
perimposed signal x transmitted by the BS is
x =
∑M
m=1
(
wm
∑Km
k=1
√
Pθm,ksm,k
)
, where wm ∈ CN×1
is the unit-norm beamforming vector for cluster m;
P represents the total transmit power; θm,k and sm,k
respectively denote power allocation ratio and information
bearing signals for user k in cluster m with E{|sm,k|2} = 1.
The received signals at user k in cluster m and Eve j are
respectively given by
ym,k = d
−α/2
m,k g
H
m,k
M∑
i=1
(
wi
Ki∑
v=1
√
Pθi,vsi,v
)
+ nm,k, (2)
ye,j = d
−α/2
e,j g
H
e,j
M∑
i=1
(
wi
Ki∑
v=1
√
Pθi,vsi,v
)
+ ne,j , (3)
where nm,k ∼ CN (0, σ2b ) and ne,j ∼ CN (0, σ2e) are the
receiver noises at user k in cluster m and Eve j, respectively.
To suppress the interference among clusters, we employ
zero-forcing beamforming based on {gˆm}Mm=1, and the nor-
malized beamformer wm for cluster m is chosen to sat-
isfy [11], [23]
gˆHn wm = 0, ∀n 6= m, n ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (4)
3On the other hand, to suppress intra-cluster interference, we
can apply successive interference cancellation (SIC) in each
cluster based on {dm,k}Kmk=1 [25]. Since the user locations
are fixed, the distance and path loss are deterministic, and
{dm,k}Kmk=1 can be obtained through the Global Positioning
System (GPS) or estimated based on signal propagation
model [26]. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
dm,1 < · · · < dm,Km . Furthermore, since the interference can-
cellation is conducted at the user side for power domain down-
link NOMA [27], perfect SIC could be obtained at users [25],
[28]. As a result, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at user k in cluster m is given by [29]
ρm,k
=
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2θm,k
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i + Pm
∑
v 6=m
|g
H
m,kwv
µm,k
|2 + 1γm,k
(5)
=
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2θm,k
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i+Pm‖sinβm,kgm,kµm,k ‖2
∑
v 6=m
|eHm,kwv|2+ 1γm,k
,
(6)
where (6) is obtained by putting (1) and (4) into (5), γm,k =
Pµ2m,kd
−α
m,k/σ
2
b , Pm =
∑Km
k=1 θm,k is the transmit power
allocated to cluster m, and it satisfies
∑M
m=1 Pm = 1. In
contrast, it is assumed that all Eves have no information
about the decoding order in the SIC detector for a cluster.
Accordingly, they cannot perform SIC within a cluster, and
the corresponding SINR of eavesdropping user k in cluster m
at Eve j is given by [29]
qjm,k =
|g
H
e,jwm
µe,j
|2θm,k
|g
H
e,jwm
µe,j
|2 ∑
i 6=k
θm,i + Pm
∑
v 6=m
|g
H
e,jwv
µe,j
|2 + 1γe,j
, (7)
where γe,j = Pµ2e,jd
−α
e,j /σ
2
e . In light of (6) and (7), the
channel capacity for user k in cluster m and the corresponding
eavesdropping capacity at Eve j are given by log2 (1 + ρm,k)
and log2
(
1 + qjm,k
)
, respectively.
For the main channel, the messages can be reliably received
by user k in cluster m when the corresponding transmission
rate Rm,k satisfies Rm,k ≤ log2 (1 + ρm,k) [30]. However,
since there is only one CDI feedback per cluster, the inter-
cluster interference cannot be perfectly removed from user
point-of-view. The residual interference is reflected by the
term
∑
v 6=m |eHm,kwv|2 in (6), and therefore log2 (1 + ρm,k)
is inaccurately known by the BS. As a result, reliable trans-
mission cannot always be guaranteed because it is possible
that Rm,k > log2 (1 + ρm,k). Hence, the connection outage
probability (COP) of user k in cluster m is expressed as [31]
COP : pm,kco = Pr {Rm,k > log2 (1 + ρm,k)} . (8)
For the jth Eve’s channel, since the BS does not know its
perfect CSI due to the passive nature of Eve j, the knowledge
of qjm,k is uncertain [32]. Consequently, a secrecy outage
event occurs at the BS when log2
(
1 + qjm,k
)
exceeds the
redundancy rate of user k in cluster m, denoted by Djm,k,
and the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of user k in cluster
m for Eve j is given by [32]
SOP : pm,k,jso = Pr
{
Djm,k < log2
(
1 + qjm,k
)}
. (9)
Considering the non-collaborative eavesdropping model, in
which all Eves do not exchange their observations or outputs,
the achievable secrecy rate for user k in cluster m is given
by [33] min
1≤j≤J
[Rm,k −Djm,k]+, which is the minimum over
the secrecy rates achieved by all Eves.
For user k in cluster m, maximizing 1 − pm,kco would
improve reliable transmission while maximizing the achiev-
able secrecy rate min
1≤j≤J
[Rm,k − Djm,k]+ would improve
secure transmission. Considering both the reliability and
security requirements for all users, we aim to maximize∑M
m=1
∑Km
k=1
(
1− pm,kco
)
min
1≤j≤J
[
Rm,k −Djm,k
]+
, which is
the security guaranteed sum-rate. Since it is known that pm,kco
in (8) is independent of Djm,k, the security guaranteed sum-
rate is equivalent to min
1≤j≤J
{∑Mm=1∑Kmk=1 (1− pm,kco )[Rm,k −
Djm,k]
+}. Considering the constraints of outage probability,
the transmission design is thus given by the following opti-
mization problem
P0 : max
S
min
1≤j≤J
{
M∑
m=1
Km∑
k=1
(
1− pm,kco
) [
Rm,k −Djm,k
]+}
,
(10a)
s.t. pm,kco ≤ δ, ∀m, k, (10b)
pm,k,jso ≤ ε, ∀m, k, j, (10c)
Km∑
k=1
θm,k = Pm, ∀m, (10d)
where S = {Rm,k ≥ 0, Djm,k ≥ 0, θm,k ≥ 0}, and δ ∈ (0, 1)
and ε ∈ (0, 1) are the predefined upper bounds representing
the maximum tolerable COP and SOP, respectively.1
Problem P0 provides an elegant formulation to measure
the secure transmission performance via (10a) and the outage
uncertainties via (10b) and (10c). It is more general than the
previous problem formulation in secure NOMA transmission
under perfect CSI of the main channel (i.e., setting δ = 0
and J = 1 in P0 reduces to the formulation in [11]). By
solving P0, we obtain not only a transmission scheme S
that maximizes the security guaranteed sum-rate, but also
the maximum value of the security guaranteed sum-rate by
computing the objective function at the optimized solution.
However, the challenges in solving P0 lie in the non-
concavity of the objective function and the probabilistic con-
straints, which do not admit simple closed-form expressions.
To circumvent the aforementioned challenges, in the next
section, we derive a closed-form expression of COP constraint
and a tight approximation to the SOP constraint.
1This assumption can be easily extended to the scenario with specific upper
bounds requirements for each user and each eavesdropper due to the parallel
structure of our proposed algorithm shown in Section IV.
4pm,kco = Pr {Rm,k > log2 (1 + ρm,k)}
= Pr
2
Rm,k − 1>
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2θm,k
|g
H
m,kwm
µm,k
|2
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i + Pm‖ gm,kµm,k ‖2 sin
2 βm,k
∑
v 6=m
|eHm,kwv|2 + 1γm,k
 (11)
= 1− exp
 1− 2Rm,k(
θm,k − (2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
)
2γm,k

1 + 2Rm,k − 1
θm,k − (2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
Pm2
− BN−1
2

1−M
,∀m, k,
(12)
III. HANDLING THE PROBABILISTIC CONSTRAINTS IN P0
We first handle the main channel outage probability.
Putting (6) into (8), pm,kco is expressed as (11), shown at the
top of this page, where (12) is derived in Appendix A.
On the other hand, putting (7) into (9), pm,k,jso is rewritten
as
pm,k,jso
=Pr
{
Djm,k < log2
(
1 + qjm,k
)}
=Pr
2D
j
m,k − 1<
|g
H
e,jwm
µe,j
|2θm,k
|g
H
e,jwm
µe,j
|2∑
i 6=k
θm,i+Pm
∑
v 6=m
|g
H
e,jwv
µe,j
|2+ 1γe,j

=Pr
{
2D
j
m,k − 1 < g
H
e,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
}
, ∀m, k, j, (13)
where Λ ∈ CN×N is given by
Λ =γe,jθm,kwmw
H
m − γe,j
(
2D
j
m,k − 1
)
wmw
H
m
∑
i 6=k
θm,i
− γe,jPm
(
2D
j
m,k − 1
) ∑
v 6=m
wvw
H
v . (14)
It is observed that pm,k,jso is expressed in the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of indefinite quadratic forms with
ge,j/µe,j ∼ CN (0, IN ). Hence, a closed-form expression
of (13) is given by [34, eq. 30]
pm,k,jso =
Np∑
i=1
N∏
v 6=i
(
1− λv
λi
)−1
exp
(
−2
Djm,k − 1
λi
)
,∀m, k, j,
(15)
where {λi}Ni=1 are the eigenvalues of Λ in descending order,
and Np denotes the number of positive and distinct eigenvalues
among {λi}Ni=1. By virtue of (12) and (15), P0 can be
equivalently transformed into P1, shown at the top of the next
page.
Since Djm,k is independent of Rm,k and θm,k, maximizing
the objective function (16a) is thereby equivalent to minimiz-
ing Djm,k. Notice that D
j
m,k appears not only in the objective
function (16a), but also through λi in (16c), making (16c)
intractable. In order to proceed, we employ the following
lemma, which provides a tighter constraint than (16c).
Lemma 1. The following constraint is a tighter constraint
than the SOP constraint of (16c):
2D
j
m,k − 1 ≥ θm,k
κm,k,j +
∑
i 6=k
θm,i
≥ 0, ∀m, k, j, (17)
where κm,k,j is given by
κm,k,j
=
1
γe,j
+PmTr
(∑
v 6=m
wvw
H
v
)
−Pm
√
2 ln(ε−1k )‖
∑
v 6=m
wvw
H
v ‖F(
1 + ln(ε−1k ) +
√
2 ln(ε−1k )
)
Tr (wmwHm)
(18)
with tunable parameter {εk ∈ (0, 1]}Kmk=1, which could be
different from ε in (16c).
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
With (16c) replaced by (17), the minimum value of Djm,k is
obtained with equality of (17) and is expressed as
D˜jm,k = log2
1 + θm,k
κm,k,j +
∑
i 6=k
θm,i
 , ∀m, k, j. (19)
Since constraint (17) is much tighter than (16c) in P1, the
obtained minimum D˜jm,k is a conservative solution to P1.
To refine the solution to P1, we can elaborately adjust εk to
reduce the conservatism and the discussion on how to select
εk is deferred to the end of Section V. Although replacing
the original SOP with a tighter constraint would result in a
solution D˜jm,k, it is still challenging to solve P1, since Rm,k
and θm,k are strongly coupled in the objective function and
the non-convex constraint (16b). To this end, we decouple the
problem P1 by introducing an auxiliary variable and provide
a conventional solution in the next section.
IV. PROBLEM DECOUPLING AND CONVENTIONAL
SOLUTION
First, we introduce an auxiliary variable
ξm,k =
2Rm,k − 1
θm,k − (2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
≥ 0, ∀m, k. (20)
5P1 : max
S
min
1≤j≤J

M∑
m=1
Km∑
k=1
exp
− 2Rm,k−1(
θm,k−(2Rm,k−1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
)
2γm,k
 [Rm,k −Djm,k]+
1 + 2Rm,k−1
θm,k−(2Rm,k−1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
Pm2
− B
N−1
2
M−1

, (16a)
s.t. exp
 1− 2Rm,k(
θm,k − (2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
)
2γm,k

1 + (2Rm,k − 1)Pm2−
B
N−1(
θm,k − (2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
)
2

1−M
≥1− δ, ∀m, k,
(16b)
Np∑
i=1
N∏
v 6=i
(
1− λv
λi
)−1
exp
(
−2
Djm,k − 1
λi
)
≤ ε, ∀m, k, j, (16c)
Km∑
k=1
θm,k = Pm, ∀m (16d)
Putting ξm,k and D˜
j
m,k into (16a), the objective function in
P1 can be rewritten as
min
1≤j≤J

M∑
m=1
Km∑
k=1
log2
 1+
ξm,kθm,k
1+ξm,k
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
1+
θm,k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
θm,i


+
exp
(
ξm,k
2γm,k
)(
1 +
ξm,kPm
2
B
N−1+1
)M−1

. (21)
Furthermore, the constraint (16b) can be rewritten as
exp
(
− ξm,k
2γm,k
)(
1+
ξm,kPm
2
B
N−1+1
)1−M
≥1− δ, ∀m, k. (22)
Based on (22), we can establish the feasible set of ξm,k with
the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 2. The feasible set of ξm,k is [0, ξubm,k], where ξubm,k is
given by
ξubm,k =2γm,k(M − 1)W0
 2
B
N−1 exp
(
2
B
N−1
γm,k(M−1)Pm
)
γm,k(M − 1)Pm(1− δ) 1M−1

− 2
B
N−1+1
Pm
.
(23)
With (21)-(23), P1 (after (16c) tightened by (17)) is trans-
formed into the following problem2
P2 : max
{ξm,k,θm,k≥0}Kmk=1
min
1≤j≤J

M∑
m=1
Km∑
k=1
exp
(
− ξm,k2γm,k
)
(
1 +
ξm,kPm
2
B
N−1+1
)M−1
×
log2

1 +
ξm,kθm,k
1+ξm,k
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
1 +
θm,k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
θm,i


+
 ,
(24a)
s.t. 0 ≤ ξm,k ≤ ξubm,k, ∀m, k, (24b)
Km∑
k=1
θm,k = Pm, ∀m. (24c)
From (18), it is known that κm,k,j is independent of ξm,k and
θm,k. Hence, the operations of maximization and minimization
in P2 can be interchanged. Furthermore, since {κm,k,j}Jj=1
are independent of one another, we can solve P2 by sep-
arately solving J independent maximization problems and
selecting the minimum value. Moreover, for subproblem j
(corresponding to Eve j), the objective function of P2 contains
a summation on m, and {ξm,k, θm,k}Mm=1 are independent
of one another. Hence, subproblem j further reduces to M
parallel subproblems, where the subproblem of cluster m with
respect to Eve j is expressed as P2[m,j], shown at the top
of the next page. Due to the reverse of minimization and
maximization in P2 and to emphasize that m and j are fixed
in P2[m,j], ξm,k and θm,k are respectively relabeled as Ξ(m,j)k
and Θ(m,j)k .
2Since P2 is not equivalent to P0 due to a safe approximation, the final
obtained solution to P2 is a feasible solution to P0.
6P2[m,j] : max
{Ξ(m,j)k ,Θ
(m,j)
k ≥0}Kmk=1
Km∑
k=1
exp
(
−Ξ
(m,j)
k
2γm,k
)
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
Pm2
− B
N−1
2
)M−1
log2

1 +
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i


+
, (25a)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ξ(m,j)k ≤ ξubm,k, ∀k, (25b)
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k = Pm, (25c)
Furthermore, since the feasible set of P2[m,j] is a Cartesian
product of closed convex sets, the objective function and con-
straints in P2[m,j] are decoupled when either {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 or
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is fixed. Accordingly, the optimization problem
can be solved via the block coordinate ascent approach [15]
for alternatively updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 and {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1.
To be specific, when fixing {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1, the subproblem of
P2[m,j] for updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is formulated as the follow-
ing multiple-ratio fractional programming (FP) problem [35]
Q1 : max
{Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1
Km∑
k=1
Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k )
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k )
, (26a)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ξ(m,j)k ≤ ξubm,k, ∀k, (26b)
where Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) and Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) are given by
Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) =
log2

1 +
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i


+
, (27)
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) = exp
(
Ξ
(m,j)
k
2γm,k
)(
1 +
Ξ
(m,j)
k Pm
2
B
N−1+1
)M−1
. (28)
Since (26a) is a sum-of-ratios objective function, a number
of approaches are able to handle this problem [16], [36],
[37]. Among them, branch-and-bound algorithm is a popular
approach that systematically subdivides the compact feasible
interval of Ξ(m,j)k to locate the global optimal solution of Q1.
However, the price for this method is the high computational
complexity when Km is large.
On the other hand, when fixing {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1, the subprob-
lem of P2[m,j] for updating {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is formulated as
D1 : max
{Θ(m,j)k ≥0}Kmk=1
Km∑
k=1
log2

1+
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
1+
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i


+
,
s.t.
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k = Pm.
(29)
Notice that the objective function can be rewritten
as [F1({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) − F2({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)]+, where
F1({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) and F2({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) are both concave
functions and given by
F1({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) =
Km∑
k=1
log2
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
+
Km∑
k=1
log2
κm,k,j +∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i
 ,
(30)
F2({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) =
Km∑
k=1
log2
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
+
Km∑
k=1
log2 (κm,k,j + Pm) . (31)
As a result, the objective function of D1 can be expressed in
a difference of convex (DC) form [17], and D1 is transformed
into a DC programming problem. Then, by employing convex-
concave procedure (CCP) [38], a suboptimal solution of D1
can be obtained. Since CCP needs to solve a convex quadratic
problem by the interior-point method, its complexity order is
O(K3m) in each iteration [39], leading to heavy-computation
when Km is large.
V. MASSIVE ACCESS WITH FIRST-ORDER ALGORITHM
To overcome the high complexity challenge brought by
the conventional method when the number of users Km
in cluster m is large, we introduce an efficient gradient-
based algorithm in this section to significantly reduce the
computational complexity. Specifically, we provide a local
optimal point for updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 when {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is
fixed and a stationary point for updating {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 when
{Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is fixed, providing an overall first-order algorithm
under the framework of alternating maximization (AM) [40].
The convergence property of the proposed algorithm is also
proved in this section.
A. Updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1
To handle the multiple-ratio FP problem Q1, we first
establish the following theorem.
7(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)−1
log
− 12
2

(
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)(
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
(
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
(κm,k,j+Pm)

(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)(
1
2γm,k
+ (M−1)Pm2
− B
N−1
2+PmΞ
(m,j)
k

2
− B
N−1
)
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k

) ln 2
=
y†k
Θ
(m,j)
k
(35)
Theorem 1. Q1 is a multiple-ratio concave-convex FP prob-
lem with concave functions Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ), convex functions
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ), and nonempty convex set.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
Based on Theorem 1, Q1 can be equivalently transformed
into [41]
Q2 : max
{Ξ(m,j)k ,yk∈R}Kmk=1
Km∑
k=1
(
2yk
√
Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k )− y2kBk(Ξ(m,j)k )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=g(Ξ
(m,j)
k ,yk)
,
(32a)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ξ(m,j)k ≤ ξubm,k, ∀k, (32b)
where {yk}Kmk=1 are auxiliary variables. When {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 are
fixed, the optimal {y†k}Kmk=1 in Q2 are derived as
y†k =
√
Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k )
/
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ), k = 1, . . . ,Km. (33)
On the other hand, when {yk}Kmk=1 are fixed, due to the concav-
ity of each Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) and convexity of each Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) from
Theorem 1, g(Ξ(m,j)k , y
†
k) is concave in Ξ
(m,j)
k . As a result,
Q2 is a concave maximization problem over Ξ(m,j)k , and the
optimal Ξ(m,j)k
†
for maximizing g(Ξ(m,j)k , y
†
k) is summarized
in the following property, which is proved in Appendix E.
Proposition 1. The optimal {Ξ(m,j)k
†}Kmk=1 in Q2 are given by
Ξ
(m,j)
k
†
= min
{
Ξ
(m,j)
k

, ξubm,k
}
, k = 1, . . . ,Km, (34)
where Ξ(m,j)k

satisfies (35), shown at the top of this page.
Based on Proposition 1, Ξ(m,j)k
†
can be efficiently found via
bisection method.
To sum up, the entire procedure for solving Q2 is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1, which is essentially a cyclic block
coordinate ascent method. Furthermore, since g(Ξ(m,j)k , yk)
is biconcave on Ξ(m,j)k and yk with separable feasible sets,
it converges to a local optimal point of Q2 [42]. On the
other hand, it is observed that variable Ξ(m,j)k maximizes
the objective function of Q1 if and only if Ξ(m,j)k
†
together
with y†k maximizes the objective function of Q2. Hence, the
transformed Q2 has equivalent objective value and solution
with respect to the original problem Q1. Based on the above
discussion, we conclude the following property with respect
to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative method for solving Q2
1: Initialize {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 to a feasible value.
2: repeat
3: Updating {yk}Kmk=1 by (33).
4: Updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 by (34).
5: until Stopping criterion is satisfied.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 consists of a sequence of concave
optimization problems, with the corresponding solutions con-
verging to a local optimal point of Q1.
B. Updating {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1
Notice that the objective function of D1 must be non-
negative at optimality. Hence, the pointwise maximum [·]+
can be dropped, and D1 is equivalent to
D2 : max
{Θ(m,j)k ≥0}Kmk=1
Km∑
k=1
log2

1 +
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f
(
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1
)
,
s.t.
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k = Pm.
(36)
Since D2 has a continuously differentiable objective function
and linear feasible set, it can be solved by the projected-
gradient (PG) method [43], which alternatively performs an
unconstrained gradient descent step and computes the pro-
jection of the unconstrained update onto the feasible set
of the optimization problem. To be specific, the update of
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 at the lth iteration is given by
Θ
(m,j)
k

(
l +
1
2
)
= Θ
(m,j)
k

(l) + I
Km∑
i=1
∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f, ∀k = 1, . . . ,Km, (37)
where I is a constant step size chosen by Armijo rule to
guarantee convergence [43, Prop. 2.3.3], and ∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f is the
gradient of f({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) at Θ(m,j)i , i ∈ {1, . . . ,Km}, with
its explicit expression shown in (63) of Appendix F. On the
other hand, to project Θ(m,j)k

(l+1/2) onto the feasible set of
8D2 to find its nearest feasible point Θ(m,j)k

(l + 1), we have
an equivalent optimization problem expressed as
Θ
(m,j)
k

(l + 1)
= arg min
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1∈PD2
Km∑
k=1
∥∥∥∥Θ(m,j)k −Θ(m,j)k (l + 12
)∥∥∥∥2 , (38)
where PD2 = {{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1|
∑Km
k=1 Θ
(m,j)
k = Pm,Θ
(m,j)
k ≥
0} is the domain of D2. Since (38) is a convex optimization
problem, a closed-form solution can be derived based on
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition and is given by the
following property, which is proved in Appendix G.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution of (38) is given by
Θ
(m,j)
k

(l + 1)=
[
Θ
(m,j)
k

(
l +
1
2
)
− 1
Km
(
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k

(
l +
1
2
)
− Pm
)]+
,∀k = 1, . . . ,Km.
(39)
Based on (37) and Proposition 2, we can iteratively update
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1, where the convergent point is guaranteed to be
a stationary point of D2 [43, Prop. 2.3]. To sum up, the above
PG method for solving D2 is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 PG method for solving D2
1: Initialize with a feasible point {Θ(m,j)k

(0)}Kmk=1 and set
l := 0.
2: repeat
3: Update {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 with the gradient iterate (37) and
projection iterate (39).
4: Update iteration: l := l + 1.
5: until Stopping criterion is satisfied.
C. Tightness Refinement and Overall Algorithm
With the update of {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 and {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 given
by Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively, subproblem P2[m,j] can
be solved under the AM framework, with the convergence
revealed by the following Theorem (proved in Appendix H).
Theorem 3. For a given {εk ∈ (0, 1]}Kmk=1, and starting from
a feasible solution of P2[m,j], the sequence of solutions gener-
ated by alternatively executing Algorithms 1 and 2 converges
to a stationary point of problem P2[m,j].
However, as pointed out by Theorem 3, the solution of
P2[m,j] would depend on the parameter εk (via κm,k,j), which
controls the tightness of the approximation in Lemma 1. In
particular, if we solve P2[m,j] with the tunable parameter
εk varying from 0 to 1 (other simulation setting detailed in
Section VI) and calculate pm,k,jso by putting the solution of
P2[m,j] into (15), we could obtain pm,k,jso as a function of εk,
denoted by pm,k,jso (εk), and the results are shown in Fig. 2 for
a few selected {m, k, j}. It is observed that pm,k,jso after a safe
approximation (named as Approximation) is usually far less
than the tunable parameter εk, as shown in the gap between the
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Fig. 2. pm,k,jso versus εk with the basic simulation setting detailed in
Section VI.
diagonal black dotted line and colored lines. However, since
pm,k,jso (εk) is nondecreasing in εk as shown in Fig. 2, we could
use the bisection method [44] to relieve the performance loss
and locate a proper εk ∈ [ε, 1] such that pm,k,jso (εk) is close
to the required ε.
Based on the above discussion, the proposed first-order
algorithm for solving P2[m,j] with tightness parameter refine-
ment is summarized in Algorithm 3 and the refined results
(named as Refinement) are shown in Fig. 2. It is observed
that pm,k,jso after refinement is very close to εk without
approximation. This indicates that although the solution set
after approximation in Lemma 1 is smaller, the corresponding
solution set after refinement approximates the original one
very well.
Notice that Algorithm 3 consists of an outer bisection
iteration and an inner AM iteration. Since the outer bisection
iteration must converge, together with Theorem 3, the overall
Algorithm 3 is guaranteed to converge. For the computational
complexity of Algorithm 3, it is dominated by the inner AM
iteration (i.e., from step 6 to step 9 in Algorithm 3). To
be specific, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is
dominated by step 4 with the bisection search to update Ξ(m,j)k
at each iteration. Hence, the complexity order for updating
{Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is O (Km ln(1/ς)) [39], where ς > 0 denotes the
predefined searching resolution of the bisection method. On
the other hand, the computational complexity of Algorithm 2
is dominated by step 3 with the gradient iteration, which
only involves the first-order differentiation. Therefore, the
complexity order for updating {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is O (Km/τ) with
an accuracy of τ [43]. Since the complexity of Algorithm 3
is linear in Km, it is suitable for massive access.
Noticing that P2 consists of MJ parallel subproblems in
the form of P2[m,j], the overall algorithm for solving P2
can be implemented in a parallel manner and is summarized
in Algorithm 4, where the modern multi-core computing
architecture can be leveraged for speeding up the computation.
9Algorithm 3 Solution of P2[m,j] with optimized tunable
parameter {εk}Kmk=1
1: input: the required ε and a predefined searching resolution
z.
2: Initialize εkmin = ε, ε
k
max = 1.
3: repeat
4: Update tunable parameter εk = (εkmin + ε
k
max)/2.
5: Initialize the feasible point of {Ξ(m,j)k ,Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1
based on (25b) and (25c).
6: repeat
7: Update {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 by using Algorithm 1.
8: Update {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 by using Algorithm 2.
9: until Stopping criterion is satisfied.
10: Calculate pm,k,jso (εk) by putting the solution of P2[m,j]
into (15) for all k.
11: if pm,k,jso (εk) < ε, then εkmin = εk,
12: else εkmax = εk.
13: end if
14: until |pm,k,jso (εk)− ε| ≤ z.
15: output: The maximizer {Ξ(m,j)k
∗
,Θ
(m,j)
k
∗}Kmk=1 with opti-
mized {εk}Kmk=1.
Algorithm 4 The overall algorithm for solving P2
1: Solve P2[m,j] in a parallel manner for all m, j by using
Algorithm 3.
2: Put {Ξ(m,j)k
∗
,Θ
(m,j)
k
∗}Kmk=1 for all m, j into the objective
function of (24a).
3: Select jˆ ∈ {1, . . . , J} such that the objective function
value of P2 is the minimum.
4: The maximizer ξ∗m,k = Ξ
(m,jˆ)
k
∗
and θ∗m,k = Θ
(m,jˆ)
k
∗
for
all m, k.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we evaluate the secure transmission per-
formance of the proposed algorithm through simulations.
All simulations are performed on MATLAB R2017a on a
Windows x64 desktop with 3.2 GHz CPU and 16 GB RAM.
Each point in the figures is obtained by averaging over 100
simulation trials. Unless otherwise specified, the simulation
set-up is as follows and kept throughout this section. We adopt
the carrier frequency of 915 MHz and a carrier spacing of
200 kHz according to the 3GPP specification [45]. The path
loss exponent is α = 2.5 in the free space environment [46].
There are 100 users and 10 Eves in the whole system. All
users are randomly distributed between 1 m and 100 m, while
the location for Eve j is fixed at de,j = 10/j m. Once the
large-scale fading parameters are generated, they are assumed
to be known and fixed throughout the simulations. The small-
scale fading vectors of all users and Eves are independently
generated according to CN (0, IN ), i.e., µm,k = µe,j = 1.
The power allocation to cluster m is set to Pm = 1/M . The
noise power at each user is set to σ2b = 0 dB, and the noise
power at each eavesdropper is set to σ2e = 5 dB. To avoid
repeating figure descriptions, the settings for (δ, ε,M,N, J, P )
are provided in the caption of each figure.
A. Performance of the Proposed First-Order Algorithm
Firstly, we demonstrate the convergence of Algorithm 3 for
solving P2[m,j] with fixed {εk = 0.1}Kmk=1. Since Algorithm 3
consists of multiple layers of iterations, stopping criterion
for each layer depends on the relative change of the two
consecutive objective function values (e.g., less than 10−4).
The convergence of the inner loop of Algorithm 1 in terms of
updating {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is shown in Fig. 3(a). It is observed that
the inner loop converges within 10 iterations under different
numbers of P , which corroborates the results in Theorem 2.
When fixing the number of cluster M , the power allocated
to each cluster increases with increasing P . As a result, the
objective function value of g(Ξ(m,j)k , yk) in Q2 increases as
P increases. On the other hand, the convergence property of
Algorithm 2 is shown in Fig. 3(b). It is shown that the PG
method converges after 300 iterations under different values
of P . To verify the convergence of Algorithm 3, Fig. 3(c)
shows the objective function value of P2[m,j] versus the inner
AM iteration. It is observed that AM converges rapidly within
25 iterations under different values of P , which corroborates
the convergence result of Theorem 3.
Next, to show the computational complexity advantage of
the proposed algorithm for solving P2, we compare Algo-
rithm 4 with the conventional method, which is the com-
bination of the branch-and-bound algorithm and CCP. To
be specific, {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is updated based on branch-and-
bound algorithm and the initial value is chosen according
to box constraint (26b); {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 is updated based on
CCP with the interior-point method and the initial value is
chosen as {Θ(m,j)k = Pm/Km}Kmk=1. Besides, the convergence
tolerance and maximum number of iterations for the con-
ventional method are set to 10−4 and 100, respectively. As
shown in Fig. 4(a), compared with the conventional method,
the proposed Algorithm 4 reduces the computation time by at
least two orders of magnitude.3 On the other hand, Fig. 4(b)
shows that the proposed Algorithm 4 achieves almost the same
security guaranteed sum-rate as the conventional method under
different values of P . Due to the complexity advantage, we
only provide the solution to P2 obtained via Algorithm 4 in
the following discussion.
B. Performance Comparisons with Other Multiplexing
Schemes
To show the performance advantages of the proposed
scheme by employing the power domain multiplexing, we
make a comparison with the orthogonal multiple access
scheme [47], where we employ zero-forcing beamforming
among clusters and time division multiple access (TDMA)
within the cluster. To begin with, we illustrate the impact
of COP constraint on system performance, where all security
guaranteed sum-rates are increasing in δ as shown in Fig. 5(a).
Moreover, the sum-rate advantage of the proposed scheme
with respect to that of TDMA becomes more prominent as
δ increases and then maintains at a large margin. A heuristic
3The proposed algorithm has the potential of leveraging the modern multi-
core computing architecture, and more efficient programming languages (C or
Assembler) to further speed up the computation in practical implementation.
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Fig. 3. For a given {εk = 0.1}Kmk=1 with M = 8, N = 100, J = 5, δ = 0.5. (a) The iterations of Algorithm 1. (b) The iterations of Algorithm 2. (c) The
AM iterations in Algorithm 3.
explanation of this phenomenon is that Ξ(m,j)k is no longer
constrained by its upper bound ξubm,k when δ is large ac-
cording to (23). When comparing two schemes in terms of
the number of clusters, Fig. 5(b) shows that the proposed
scheme significantly improves the security guaranteed sum-
rate of the TDMA scheme under different values of M . When
fixing P , the power allocated to each cluster decreases as M
increases. As a result, the sum-rate decreases as M increases.
Furthermore, with an increase of J , the performance degrades
due to more Eves in the system.
To show the importance of considering imperfect CSI, we
compare the proposed scheme with NOMA that does not
consider the imperfect CSI [11]. To make a fair comparison
with [11], we simulate both schemes under the same security
requirement and select J = 1. The security guaranteed sum-
rate versus ε and P are provided in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b),
respectively. It can be seen that the proposed scheme always
achieves significantly higher sum-rates than NOMA ignoring
CSI uncertainty. Finally, Fig. 6(b) shows that the security
guaranteed sum-rate decreases as N increases, which might
seem counterintuitive. However, this is due to the coarser CDI
when N increases under a fixed B. This phenomenon can
be seen in (21), where B and N appear in a ratio. This
also suggests using more feedback bits would remedy the
performance loss.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the secure downlink NOMA transmission
under imperfect CSI. To characterize the performance of this
system, an efficient first-order algorithm was proposed to max-
imize the security guaranteed sum-rate under the constraints
of outage probability and transmit power budget. Since the
proposed first-order algorithm is Hessian-free, it has a linear
complexity order with respect to the number of users in the
system, making it ideal for massive access scenarios. Numeri-
cal results demonstrated that the proposed first-order algorithm
achieves identical performance to the conventional method but
saves at least two orders of magnitude in computation time,
and it significantly improves the security guaranteed sum-
rate compared to orthogonal multiple access transmission, and
NOMA transmission ignoring CSI uncertainty.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (12)
Based on (11), pm,kco can be expressed as
pm,kco
=Pr
2
Rm,k − 1> X θm,k
X
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i + PmY + 1γm,k

=Pr

2Rm,k − 1
θm,k−(2Rm,k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
θm,i
>
X
PmY + 1γm,k
 , (40)
where X = |gHm,kwm/µm,k|2 ≥ 0, Y =
‖gm,k/µm,k‖2 sin2 βm,k
∑
v 6=m |eHm,kwv|2 ≥ 0, and (40)
is due to θm,k −
(
2Rm,k − 1)∑k−1i=1 θm,i > 0 [48, eq. 8],
otherwise, pm,kco is always one. Furthermore, based on the
independent property of the interference terms [23, eq. 24],
variables of X and Y are independent.
To obtain a closed-form expression of pm,kco , we first provide
the probability density function (PDF) of X . Denote Ψm,k =
gm,k
µm,k
∼ CN (0, IN ) and Ψ˜m,k = Ψm,k/‖Ψm,k‖, X can
be rewritten as ‖Ψm,k‖2|Ψ˜Hm,kwm|2. Since the normalized
beamformer wm is determined by {gˆn}n 6=m according to (4)
and {gˆn}n 6=m is independent of gm,k, gm,k and wm are
independent. As a result, Ψ˜m,k and wm are independent and
unit vectors in N dimensional space. Based on [49, Lemma 1],
the square inner product between two independent unit-norm
random vectors X1 := |Ψ˜Hm,kwm|2 follows Beta(1, N − 1)
and its PDF is fX1(x1) = (1 − x1)N−2/Be(1, N − 1), x1 ∈
[0, 1], where Be(x, y) is the beta function [50, eq. 8.380]. On
the other hand, since Ψm,k ∼ CN (0, IN ), X2 := ‖Ψm,k‖2
follows a χ2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom, and
its PDF is fX2(x2) =
xN−12 e
−x2/2
2NΓ(N)
, x2 ≥ 0, where Γ(x) is the
Gamma function [50, eq. 8.310]. Since X = X1X2 and X1
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison with the conventional method with M = 8, N = 100, J = 5, P = 10dB, ε = 0.1, δ = 0.5. (a) Average computation
time versus total number of users. (b) Security guaranteed sum-rate versus total number of users.
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Fig. 5. Comparison with TDMA scheme with N = 100: (a) Security guaranteed sum-rates versus δ: M = 8, J = 5, ε = 0.3. (b) Security guaranteed
sum-rates versus M : P = −5dB, δ = 0.3, ε = 0.1.
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Fig. 6. Comparison with NOMA ignoring CSI uncertainty [11] with M = 8: (a) Security guaranteed sum-rates versus ε: N = 100, P = 10dB. (b) Security
guaranteed sum-rates versus P : ε = 0.1, δ = 0.3.
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and X2 are independent, the PDF of X is given by
fX (x) =
∫
x2
1
|x2|fX2(x2)fX1
(
x
x2
)
dx2
=
∫ +∞
x
(x2 − x)N−2e−
x2
2 dx2
Be(1, N − 1)2NΓ(N)
=
1
2
e−
x
2 , x ≥ 0. (41)
Now, we derive the PDF of Y . The cumulative distribution
function of sin2 βm,k is given by [13]
F
(
sin2βm,k
)
=
{
2B
(
sin2βm,k
)N−1
, if 0 ≤ sin2 βm,k ≤ 2− BN−1 ,
1, if sin2 βm,k ≥ 2− BN−1 .
(42)
Hence, we have ‖Ψm,k‖2 sin2 βm,k ∼ G
(
N − 1, 2− BN−1
)
(gamma distribution with shape N − 1 and scale 2− BN−1 ) [13,
Lemma 1]. On the other hand, it is known that em,k is a
unit vector that has the same distribution as Ψ˜m,k. Moreover,
the unit vector wv is isotropic within the N − 1 dimensional
hyperplane and independent of em,k. Based on [24, Lemma
2], we have |eHm,kwv|2 ∼ Beta(1, N − 2). Therefore, by
applying [51, Lemma 1], ‖Ψm,k‖2 sin2 βm,k|eHm,kwv|2 ∼
Exp
(
2
B
N−1
)
. Since all terms {eHm,kwv}v 6=m are independent
of one another, Y is the sum of (M−1) independent and iden-
tically exponentially distributed random variables. Therefore,
Y ∼ G
(
M − 1, 2− BN−1
)
and its PDF is expressed as
fY(y) =
yM−2 exp
(
−y2 BN−1
)
2−
B(M−1)
N−1 Γ(M − 1)
, y > 0. (43)
Finally, based on (41) and (43), (40) is further derived as
pm,kco = Pr
{
X − PmIY < I
γm,k
}
= 1− e−
I
2γm,k
∫ ∞
0
yM−2e
−y
(
2
B
N−1 +PmI2
)
2−
B(M−1)
N−1 Γ(M − 1)
dy
= 1− e−
I
2γm,k
(
1 +
PmI2
− BN−1
2
)−(M−1)
, (44)
where I = 2
Rm,k−1
θm,k−(2Rm,k−1)
∑k−1
i=1 θm,i
> 0, and (44) follows
from [50, eq. 3.326]. By putting I into (44), pm,kco is obtained
as shown in (12).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
By putting (18) into (17) and re-arranging the terms, we
obtain (45), shown at the top of the next page, where Wm =
wmw
H
m, W
⊥
m =
∑
v 6=m wvw
H
v . In order to proceed, we
provide the following three facts based on (14). Denote the
largest eigenvalue of Λ by λmax(Λ), we have
[λmax(Λ)]
+
≤λmax
γe,j
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i6=k
θm,i
Wm

≤γe,j
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i 6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm) . (46)
On the other hand, we have (47), shown at the top of the next
page, where step (a) follows from the triangle inequality of
the norm, and step (b) follows from ‖Wm‖F =
√∑N
i=1 r
2
i ≤∑N
i=1 ri = Tr (Wm) with {ri ≥ 0}Ni=1 being the eigenvalues
of Wm. Furthermore, Tr (Λ) is expressed as
Tr (Λ) =γe,j
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i 6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm)
− γe,jPm
(
2D
j
m,k − 1
)
Tr
(
W⊥m
)
. (48)
Applying (46)-(48) to (45), we obtain
2D
j
m,k − 1 ≥
Tr (Λ) +
√
2 ln(ε−1k )‖Λ‖F + ln(ε−1k )[λmax(Λ)]+.
(49)
Comparing both sides of (49) with
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
and taking
probability, we have
Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
> 2D
j
m,k − 1
}
≤ Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
≥
Tr(Λ) +
√
2 ln(ε−1k )‖Λ‖F + ln(ε−1k )[λmax(Λ)]+
}
.
(50)
On the other hand, since ge,j/µe,j ∼ CN (0, IN ), together
with the Hermitian matrix Λ ∈ CN×N , for any  ≥ 0, we
have
Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
≥ Tr(Λ) +
√
2‖Λ‖F + [λmax(Λ)]+
}
≤ exp(−), (51)
which is the Bernstein-Type Inequality (BTI) [14] and always
holds. By substituting  = ln(ε−1k ) into (51), we obtain
Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
≥Tr(Λ) +
√
2 ln(ε−1k )‖Λ‖F
+ ln(ε−1k )[λmax(Λ)]
+
}
≤ εk
(52)
for any εk ∈ (0, 1]. Substituting (52) into (50), we obtain
Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
> 2D
j
m,k − 1
}
≤ εk. (53)
As a result, Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
> 2D
j
m,k − 1
}
≤ ε holds when
we set εk = ε. Applying the result of [34, eq. 30], it can be
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2D
j
m,k − 1
γe,j
≥
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm)− Pm (2Djm,k − 1)Tr (W⊥m)
+
√
2 ln(ε−1k )
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm) + Pm (2Djm,k − 1) ‖W⊥m‖F

+ ln(ε−1k )
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i 6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm)
(45)
‖Λ‖F
(a)
≤ γe,j
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i 6=k
θm,i
 ‖Wm‖F + Pm (2Djm,k − 1) ‖W⊥m‖F

(b)
≤ γe,j
θm,k − (2Djm,k − 1)∑
i 6=k
θm,i
Tr (Wm) + Pm (2Djm,k − 1) ‖W⊥m‖F
 (47)
shown that Pr
{
gHe,j
µe,j
Λ
ge,j
µe,j
> 2D
j
m,k − 1
}
≤ ε is equivalent
to (16c). Therefore, if (17) holds for any εk ∈ (0, 1], then (16c)
holds, i.e., (17) is a tighter constraint than the SOP constraint
of (16c).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since by definition (20), ξm,k ≥ 0. Hence, we only need
to find the upper bound of ξm,k to determine its feasible set.
Denote q (ξm,k) equals to the left hand side of (22), the first-
order derivative of q (ξm,k) is given by
q′ (ξm,k) = −
(
2+ξm,kPm2
− B
N−1
4γm,k
+ (M−1)Pm2
− B
N−1
2
)
exp
(
ξm,k
2γm,k
)(
1 +
ξm,kPm2
− B
N−1
2
)M , (54)
which is negative for M ≥ 1. With the decreasing property of
q (ξm,k) and lower boundedness of q (ξm,k) in (22), an upper
bound of ξm,k, denoted by ξubm,k, is obtained by solving the
following equation
exp
(
− ξ
ub
m,k
2γm,k
)(
1 + ξubm,k
Pm2
− BN−1
2
)1−M
= 1− δ. (55)
By straightforward algebra, (55) can be further re-expressed
as
2
B
N−1 +
Pmξ
ub
m,k
2
Pmγm,k(M − 1) exp
 2 BN−1 + Pmξubm,k2
Pmγm,k(M − 1)

=
2
B
N−1 exp
(
2
B
N−1
γm,k(M−1)Pm
)
γm,k(M − 1)Pm(1− δ) 1M−1
.
(56)
With the help of the principal branch of Lambert W func-
tion [20], (56) is rewritten as
W0
 2
B
N−1 exp
(
2
B
N−1
γm,k(M−1)Pm
)
γm,k(M − 1)Pm(1− δ) 1M−1
 = 2 BN−1 + Pmξ
ub
m,k
2
Pmγm,k(M − 1) .
(57)
Re-arranging the terms in (57) leads to (23).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Firstly, since the feasible set of Q1 is determined by (26b)
with simple bound constraints, it must be a nonempty standard
convex set.
Secondly, to prove the concavity of Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ),
we rewrite Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) as Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) =[
log2(1 + E(Ξ
(m,j)
k ))− log2
(
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k Θm,i
)]+
,
where E(Ξ(m,j)k ) =
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
∑k−1
i=1 Θ
(m,j)
i
≥ 0. The first-order
and second-order derivatives of E(Ξ(m,j)k ) are respectively
given by
E′(Ξ(m,j)k ) =
Θm,k(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)2 ≥ 0, (58)
E′′(Ξ(m,j)k ) =
−2Θ(m,j)k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)3 ≤ 0. (59)
Since E′′(Ξ(m,j)k ) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ Ξ(m,j)k ≤ ξubm,k, E(Ξ(m,j)k )
is concave on Ξ(m,j)k . Furthermore, due to the concavity
and non-decreasing property of function log2(1 + x) with
x > 0, log2(1 +E(Ξ
(m,j)
k ))− log2
(
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k Θ
(m,j)
i
)
14
Θ
(m,j)
k
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)−1
A˜
−1/2
k (Ξ
(m,j)
k

)(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
 k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k

) ln 2
=y†k
(
1
2γm,k
+
(M − 1)Pm2− BN−1
2 + PmΞ
(m,j)
k

2−
B
N−1
)
(61)
is concave on Ξ(m,j)k . Since pointwise maximum operation
preserves concavity [52], Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) is concave on Ξ
(m,j)
k .
Thirdly, to prove the convexity of Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ), we rewrite
Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) as bˆk(Ξ
(m,j)
k )b˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ), where bˆk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) :=
exp
(
Ξ
(m,j)
k
2γm,k
)
and b˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) :=
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
Pm
2
B
N−1+1
)M−1
.
It is obvious that bˆk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) is convex on Ξ
(m,j)
k . On the other
hand, since b˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) is the composition with an affine map-
ping from the convex function xM−1 with x ≥ 0, b˜k(Ξ(m,j)k )
has the same convex property as xM−1. Considering that
bˆk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) and b˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) are both convex, Bk(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) is
convex since convexity is closed under multiplication and
positive scaling [52].
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The maximizer for Q2 would either be at the station-
ary point Ξ(m,j)k

or boundary points of the feasible range
[0, ξubm,k]. Since g(0, y
†
k) = 0 and the objective function of Q2
must be non-negative at optimality, the optimal Ξ(m,j)k
†
cannot
be 0. As a result, the optimal Ξ(m,j)k
†
is either Ξ(m,j)k

or ξubm,k.
On the other hand, if Ξ(m,j)k

> ξubm,k, then Ξ
(m,j)
k
†
= ξubm,k
since the optimal Ξ(m,j)k
† ≤ ξubm,k. Otherwise, due to the
concavity of g(Ξ(m,j)k , y
†
k) on Ξ
(m,j)
k , Ξ
(m,j)
k
†
= Ξ
(m,j)
k

.
Therefore, the optimal Ξ(m,j)k
†
is obtained as shown in (34).
Next, we determine the stationary point
Ξ
(m,j)
k

. The pointwise-maximum function
Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) can be rewritten as Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) =
A˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k )I
(
Ξ
(m,j)
k >
(
κm,k,j +
∑
i=k+1 Θ
(m,j)
i
)−1)
,
where A˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) is given by
A˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) = log2

1 +
Ξ
(m,j)
k Θ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
1 +
Θ
(m,j)
k
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i
 , (60)
and I(H) is the indicator function with I(H) = 1 if the
event H occurs and I(H) = 0 otherwise. It is known that
if Ak(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) = 0, g(Ξ
(m,j)
k , y
†
k) = 0 and the objective
function of Q2 is always 0. Hence, substituting Ak(Ξ(m,j)k ) =
A˜k(Ξ
(m,j)
k ) into g(Ξ
(m,j)
k , y
†
k), the stationary point Ξ
(m,j)
k

is the unique root for ∂g(Ξ
(m,j)
k ,y
†
k)
∂Ξ
(m,j)
k
= 0, which is equivalent
to (61), shown at the top of this page. Re-arranging the terms
in (61) lead to (35).
APPENDIX F
DERIVATION OF THE GRADIENT OF f({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)
From (36), f({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) can be rewritten as
f({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)
= log2
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f1({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)
− log2
(
1 + Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f2({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)
+ log2
κm,k,j +∑
i 6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f3({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1)
− log2 (κm,k,j + Pm) .
(62)
Then, the gradient of f1, f2 and f3 with respect
to Θ(m,j)i , i ∈ {1, . . . ,Km} are respectively
derived as ∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f1 =
1
ln 2
Ξ
(m,j)
k I(i≤k)
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
∑k
i=1 Θ
(m,j)
i
,
∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f2 =
1
ln 2
Ξ
(m,j)
k I(i<k)
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
∑k−1
i=1 Θ
(m,j)
i
, and ∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f3 =
1
ln 2
I(i6=k)
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k Θ
(m,j)
i
. Therefore, the gradient of
f({Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1) with respect to Θ(m,j)i , i ∈ {1, . . . ,Km} is
given by (63), shown at the top of the next page.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The Lagrangian function of (38) is given by
L
(
{Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1, ζ
)
=
Km∑
k=1
∥∥∥∥Θ(m,j)k −Θ(m,j)k (l + 12
)∥∥∥∥2
+ ζ
(
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k − Pm
)
, (64)
where ζ is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint
in (36). Based on feasible set PD2 , Θ(m,j)k can be either 0
or positive. If Θ(m,j)k > 0, the optimal solution must satisfy
the following KKT conditions: Θ(m,j)k
† −Θ(m,j)k

(l+ 1/2) +
ζ†/2 = 0 and
∑Km
k=1 Θ
(m,j)
k
† − Pm = 0. Therefore, Θ(m,j)k
†
is derived as Θ(m,j)k
†
= Θ
(m,j)
k

(l + 1/2) − ζ†/2, where the
optimal ζ† is given by
ζ† =
2
Km
(
Km∑
k=1
Θ
(m,j)
k

(
l +
1
2
)
− Pm
)
. (65)
Together with the case of Θ(m,j)k = 0, the optimal solution
to (38) is shown in (39).
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∇
Θ
(m,j)
i
f =

1
ln 2
 Ξ(m,j)k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
− Ξ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k−1∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
+ 1
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i
 , if i < k,
1
ln 2
Ξ
(m,j)
k
1+Ξ
(m,j)
k
k∑
i=1
Θ
(m,j)
i
, if i = k,
1
ln 2
1
κm,k,j+
∑
i6=k
Θ
(m,j)
i
, if i > k
(63)
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Define Z = (Ξ,Θ) ∈ Z as the composite vector with
Ξ := {Ξ(m,j)k }Kmk=1 and Θ := {Θ(m,j)k }Kmk=1, where Z is the
feasible set of P2[m,j]. Furthermore, the lth AM iteration
is denoted by Z(l) = (Ξ(l),Θ(l)), the sequence in between
is denoted by Z(l+
1
2 ) = (Ξ(l+1),Θ(l)), and the objective
function of P2[m,j] is denoted by Υ(Z). First, we show that
the sequence of solutions converges to a limit point Z∗.
Lemma 3. The sequence of solutions {Z(l)}l∈N generated by
AM iteration is bounded and must have a limit point Z∗.
Proof. We first prove that Υ(Z) is monotonically increasing as
iteration number increases. It is known that for the lth iteration,
to update Ξ(l) with Algorithm 1, the obtained point Ξ(l+1) is a
local optimal point, and it must be a saddle-point for P2[m,j].
Together with the property of saddle-points [53], we have the
following inequality
Υ(Z(l+
1
2 )) ≥ Υ(Z(l)). (66)
On the other hand, with Algorithm 2, the obtained Θ(l+1) is a
stationary point. Furthermore, since the feasible set of P2[m,j]
is a Cartesian product of convex sets, the optimization over Θ
is independent on Ξ. Hence, we have the following inequality
Υ(Z(l+1)) ≥ Υ(Z(l+ 12 )). (67)
Combining (66) and (67), we conclude that
Υ(Z(l+1)) ≥ Υ(Z(l)) ≥ · · · ≥ Υ(Z(0)),∀l ∈ {1, 2 . . .}, (68)
where Υ(Z(0)) is any finite initial value of the objective
function.
Then we prove the boundedness of the sequence of solutions
{Z(l)}l∈N generated by AM iteration. It is observed that
Ξ and Θ are respectively located in separable closed sets
based on (25b) and (25c). Hence, the sequence {Z(l)}l∈N is
bounded. Together with monotonic property of (68), {Z(l)}l∈N
must have a limit point Z∗ based on Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem [54].
To further investigate the property of limit point Z∗, we first
recall the notion of gradient mapping. The gradient mappings
with respect to Z ∈ Z for any L > 0 is defined as [55]
GL(Z) = L
(
Z− proxΥL
(
Z− 1
L
∇Υ(Z)
))
, (69)
where proxΥL(Z) := arg min
U∈Z
{
Υ(U) + L2 ‖U− Z‖2
}
is the
proximal mapping associated to Υ [40]. From (69), the
corresponding partial gradient mappings on Ξ with constant
L1 <∞ and Θ with constant L2 <∞ are respectively given
by
GΞL1(Z) = L1
(
Ξ− proxΥL1
(
Ξ− 1
L1
∇ΞΥ(Z)
))
, (70)
GΘL2(Z) = L2
(
Θ− proxΥL2
(
Θ− 1
L2
∇ΘΥ(Z)
))
. (71)
Then, based on partial gradient mappings, we have the fol-
lowing sufficient increase property.
Lemma 4. Updating Z by using AM iteration, the following
inequalities hold for l ∈ {1, 2 . . .}
Υ(Z(l+
1
2 ))−Υ(Z(l)) ≥ 1
2L1
‖GΞL1(Z(l))‖2, (72)
Υ(Z(l+1))−Υ(Z(l+ 12 )) ≥ 1
2L2
‖GΘL2(Z(l+
1
2 ))‖2. (73)
Proof. Since the converged Ξ(l+1) for the lth iteration is
a local optimal point of Q1 according to Theorem 2,
(Ξ(l+1),Θ(l)) ∈ proxΥL(Z(l)). Furthermore, the partial gra-
dient of Υ(Z) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to Ξ
for any Θ satisfying constraint (25c). Applying the result
in [56, Lemma 2], we have Υ(Ξ(l+1),Θ(l))−Υ(Ξ(l),Θ(l)) ≥
1
2L1
‖GΞL1(Z(l))‖2, which is equivalent to (72). On the other
hand, since the converged Θ(l+1) is a stationary point
of D2, we have (Ξ(l+1),Θ(l+1)) ∈ proxΥL(Z(l+
1
2 )). Sim-
ilarly, we have Υ(Ξ(l+1),Θ(l+1)) − Υ(Ξ(l+1),Θ(l)) ≥
1
2L2
‖GΘL2(Z(l+
1
2 ))‖2, which is equivalent to (73).
Finally, we prove the limit point Z∗ is a stationary point of
P2[m,j] based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. From Lemma 3,
there exists a subsequence {Z(l)}l∈N converges to a limit
point Z∗, and {Υ(Z(l))}l∈N is a nondecreasing upper-bounded
sequence. Hence, {Υ(Z(l))}l∈N must converge to some fi-
nite value and Υ(Z(l+1)) − Υ(Z(l)) → 0 as l → ∞.
Together with Lemma 4, we conclude that GΞL1(Z
(l)) → 0
and GΘL2(Z
(l+ 12 )) → 0 as l → ∞, which implies that
GΞL1(Z
∗) = 0 and GΘL2(Z
∗) = 0 due to the continuity of
partial gradient mappings GΞL1 and G
Θ
L2
. Therefore, the limit
point Z∗ is a stationary point [56].
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